HomeCrimeStatute that may unwind Jan. 6 convictions heard by SCOTUS

Statute that may unwind Jan. 6 convictions heard by SCOTUS

FILE - President Donald Trump speaks during a rally protesting the electoral college certification of Joe Biden as President in Washington, Jan. 6, 2021. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci, File). Insets clockwise from top left: Jan. 6 rioter Kevin Seefried carries a Confederate flag through the U.S. Capitol; Jan. 6 rioter Joseph Fischer inside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021; Oath Keepers in a stack formation on Capitol stairs on Jan. 6, 2021. Photos provided by U.S. Justice Department.

FILE – President Donald Trump speaks during a rally protesting the electoral college certification of Joe Biden as President in Washington, Jan. 6, 2021. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci, File). Insets clockwise from top left: Jan. 6 rioter Kevin Seefried carries a Confederate flag through the U.S. Capitol; Jan. 6 rioter Joseph Fischer inside the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021; Oath Keepers in a stack formation on Capitol stairs on Jan. 6, 2021. Photos provided by U.S. Justice Department.

Justices at the U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday appeared dubious and divided during oral arguments in Fischer v. United States, a case that could have huge ramifications on charges applied to hundreds of Jan. 6 rioters as well as charges against former President Donald Trump in his criminal election subversion case in Washington, D.C.

As Law&Crime previously reported, at the center of the arguments is a man named Joseph Fischer, a former police officer with the North Cornwall Township Police Department in Pennsylvania accused of yelling “Charge!” before running toward a line of police defending the Capitol on Jan. 6. Fischer is also alleged to have had a “physical encounter with at least one police officer” and prosecutors said he could be heard on footage screaming “hold the line” and “motherf—–” at them.

After Jan. 6, Fischer was remorseless. In a Facebook message he sent on Jan. 7,  he complained about potentially needing a new job after his boss learned of his whereabouts. In another message, Fischer said he told the chief if losing his job was the “price I have to pay to voice my freedom and liberties which I was born with and thusly taken away, then [that] must be the price.”

“I told him I have no regrets and give zero sh—. Sometimes doing the right thing no matter how small is more important than one’s own security,” he proclaimed.

These details are important because for prosecutors, including Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar who argued for the government on Tuesday, it all goes toward proving Fischer’s corrupt intent to stop an official proceeding.

The statute Fischer and at least 350 other Jan. 6 rioters were charged or convicted under, 18 U.S. Code § 1512(c), states:

Whoever corruptly (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Fischer’s lawyer Jeffrey Green tried to persuade justices that this language — established roughly 20 years ago in response to the Enron scandal — was meant to cover the tampering with or destruction of evidence and that the subsequent use of  “otherwise” in the statute’s language was overbroad, converting what was intended to be “catchall” provision into an unconstitutional “dragnet.”

Telling the high court that the statute should “be written more precisely,” Green argued the statute’s drafters never imagined it would automatically cover “official proceedings” and that they envisioned it only pertaining to “evidence” underlying a proceeding, if anything.

Though Justice Samuel Alito would seem to err more on his side later in arguments Tuesday, he nonetheless pressed Green, when he noted to the lawyer that the specific types of conduct laid out in the first sentence of the statute shared a commonality with what was laid out in the second.

“They all involve documents or objects and all involve the impairment of the integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding, so the similarity could be either of those things,” Alito said. “You may be biting off more than you can chew if you are indeed suggesting that the ‘otherwise’ clause can only be read the way you read it. It can certainly be read the way the government reads it and that might be the more straightforward reading.”

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